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1968/03/12

Phu Bai
10 Mar 68

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DATE 14 MAR 68

DECLASSIFIED
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By ics, NARS, Date 9-5-84

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FM CG III MAF

TO RUNSAH/COMUSMACV

INFO ZEN/G PROV CORPS V

ZEN/CG 1ST AIR CAV DIV

ZEN/CG 101ST ABN DIV

RUMHVP/CG THIRD MARDIV

RUM[illegible]A/ FIRST MARDIV

RUMHIC/CG AMERICAL DIV

BT

CI IA RUMN COC
13 Mar 68

A - COC
X - C/S
X - Hist
X - SOG
X - J1
X - J2
X - J3
X - J4
X - J5
X - J6
X - Comp
X - MACOI
X - MA CDC
X - NAVFORV
X - CORDS
X - USARV
X - 7AF
X - III MAF/LNO

CY 8 of 29 CYS

~~TOP SECRET~~ LIMDIS

VISIT OF COMUSMACV AND DEPCOMUSMACV

1. GEN WESTMORELAND AND GEN ABRAMS VISITED PHU BAI ON 10 MARCH TO RECEIVE A CONCEPT OF FUTURE OPERATIONS BRIEFING.

2. THE PROV CORPS V STAFF INTRODUCED THREE OPTIONS

PLAN 1 - - AN ATTACK TO CLEAR THE COASTAL PLAIN FROM DONG HA TO THE DMZ.

FORCES REQUIRED:

1 MARINE REGIMENT FROM THE 3RD MARINE DIVISION

2 MARINE BATTALIONS FROM THE 1ST MARINE DIVISION

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3 BDES FROM THE 1ST AIR CAV DIV

3 ARVN BATTALIONS ORGANIZED INTO AN ARVN TASK FORCE

2ND/34TH ARMOR

3RD/5TH ARMD CAV

11TH ENGR BATTALION

1 AMTRAC BATTALION

PLAN 2 - - AN ATTACK TO OPEN ROUTE 9 AND DESTROY THE ENEMY NEAR THE KHE SANH COMBAT BASE.

FORCES REQUIRED:

2 BDES FROM 1ST AIR CAVDIV

1 MARINE REGIMENT COMPOSED OF:

2 BNS FROM 1ST MARINE DIVISION

1 BN FROM 3RD MARINE DIVISION

ARVN TASK FORCE OF 3 BATTALIONS

2ND/34TH ARMOR

3D/5TH ARMORED CAVALRY

11TH ENGR BATTALION

MOBILE STRIKE FORCES

PLAN 3 - - AN ATTACK TO DESTROY THE ENEMY IN ASHUA VALLEY.

FORCES REQUIRED:

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2 BDES FROM 101ST ABN DIV

1 BDE FROM 1ST AIR CAV DIV

ARVN TASK FORCE OF 3 BNS

14TH ENGR BN

PROJECT DELTA FORCES

MOBILE STRIKE FORCES

3. THE FOLLOWING MATTERS WERE COVERED DURING THE COURSE OF THE BRIEFING AND DISCUSSIONS WHICH FOLLOWED:

A. GEN WESTMORELAND AGREED WITH LGEN CUSHMAN'S EVALUATION OF THE NECESSITY OF CONDUCTING THE KHE SANH CAMPAIGN AS A MATTER OF HIGHEST PRIORITY.

B. GEN WESTMORELAND ISSUED THE FOLLOWING BROAD GUIDANCE FOR FUTURE OPNS:

(1) PHASE I - WOULD INCLUDE CLEANUP OF HUE AND SURROUNDING AREAS AND ESTABLISHMENT OF A BLOCKING FORCE FROM THE 101ST ABN DIV ALONG RT 547. GEN WESTMORELAND WANTS TO CANCEL ASHUA AS A MAJOR CAMPAIGN BUT WOULD LIKE TO HAVE A BDE OF THE 101ST ABN DIV MOVE FORCES OUT AS FAR AS THE CUMBERLAND FIRE BASE AND EXECUTE AIR MOBILE OPERATIONS FROM THERE, WORKING CLOSELY WITH THE MOBILE STRIKE FORCES, SOG ASSETS AND THE DELTA FORCE. DURING

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THIS PHASE; HE ALSO WANTED TO DEVELOP A TARGET LIST IN ASHUA. LUCRATIVE TARGETS WHERE THE ENEMY COULD BE HURT SERIOUSLY. HE MENTIONED THAT POSSIBLY A RAID TO THE VALLEY FLOOR MIGHT BE PROFITABLE BUT THAT OUR FIREPOWER MUST DESTROY THE ENEMY. PHASE I WOULD ALSO INCLUDE CONTINUATION OF CURRENT OPERATIONS IN THE DONG HA/CON THIEN AREA. HE SAID THAT WE MUST CONTINUE TO POLICE UP THE COASTAL REGION. WE MUST ALSO CONTINUE OUR AIR CAMPAIGN FAR[illegible]ER NORTH, TRY TO LOCATE ENEMY ARTILLERY THERE, AND HOPEFULLY KNOCK OUT HALF OF IT BY SEPTEMBER. PHASE I WOULD ALSO INCLUDE PREPARATORY WORK ON ROUTE 9, OPENING IT AS FAR AS CA LU.

(2) PHASE II WOULD INCLUDE THE OPENING OF RTE 9 TO KHE SANH BY THE MARINE REGIMENT IN CONJUNCTION WITH AIR ASSAULTS BY THE 1ST AIR CAV DIV AND OVERLAND ATK BY AN ARVN TASK FORCE.

(3) PHASE III - WOULD OCCUR IN THE AUGUST - SEPTEMBER TIME FRAME AND WOULD INCLUDE AN OPERATION TO CLEAR DONG HA/CON THIEN COASTAL REGIONS UP TO THE DMZ.

4. OTHER ITEMS INTRODUCED BY COMUSMACV DURING THE BRIEFING ARE SET FORTH BELOW:

A. KHE SANH CAN EXPECT ABOUT 10 INCHES OF RAIN IN JUNE; HE INDICATED THAT SERIOUS THOUGHT SHOULD BE GIVEN TO DRAINAGE THERE.

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B. WEATHER AT CON THIEN SHOULD BE GOOD UNTIL SEPTEMBER, WHICH WAS ANOTHER REASON FOR THINKING THAT THE CON THIEN OPERATION COULD BE DELAYED UNTIL SEPTEMBER. HE HOPES, BY GOOD PHOTO INTERPRETATION, USE OF TACTICAL AIR AND FORWARD AIR CONTROLLERS, THAT WE SHOULD BE ABLE TO LOCATE MUCH OF THE ARTILLERY AND DESTROY IT. HOPEFULLY WE WILL ALSO LOCATE THE SA-2 MISSILE SITES AND DESTROY THEM SO THAT OUR B-52S CAN START OPERATING IN THE AR . HE POINTED OUT THAT SUCH OPERATIONS ARE NOW TOO HAZARDOUS.

C. HE INDICATED THAT WE SHOULD CONSIDER BUILDING A ROAD UP THE BA LONG VALLEY. THE PROV CORPS V ENGINEER POINTED OUT THAT THIS WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO CONCLUDE SUCCESSFULLY.

D. GEN WESTMORELAND SAID WE MUST USE CAUTION IN THE EMPLOYMENT OF GRAVEL MINES AND MAKE SURE WE STOP AT THE APPROPRIATE TIME SO THAT THE GRAVEL WILL STERILIZE ITSELF AND NOT BECOME A PROBLEM FOR OUR OPERATING FORCES.

E. GEN WESTMORELAND INDICATED THAT ADDITIONAL REQUESTS FOR HELICOPTERS IN ICTZ COULD NOT BE FAVORABLY RECEIVED.

F. DEPCOMUSMACV INTRODUCED THE IDEA THAT BETWEEN NOW AND 1 APRIL SOME PRELIMINARY OPERATIONS COULD BE CONDUCTED BETWEEN BASE AREA 114 AND HUE. HE THOUGHT THESE OPERATIONS COULD BE DONE IN

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ADDITION TO THE ROUTE 547 BLOCKING FORCE. GEN WESTMORELAND AGREED.

G. DEPCOMUSMACV ALSO MADE THE POINT THAT THE 1ST AIR CAV DEVISION SHOULD BE PREPARED TO COMMIT ITS THIRD BDE INTO THE KHE SANH FIGHT IF NECESSARY. GEN WESTMORELAND ENDORSED THIS IDEA.

H. THE TARGET DATE FOR THE KHE SANH OPERATION WAS SET FOR 1 APRIL. IT WAS POINTED OUT THAT FAVORABLE WEATHER MIGHT MAKE POSSIBLE TO ADVANCE THIS SOMEWHAT BUT THAT 1 APRIL WAS A REALISTIC PLANNING DATE.

5. FOLLOWING THIS BRIEFING A PRIVATE SESSION WAS HELD WITH COMUSMACV, DEPCOMUSMACV, CG III MAF, CG PROV CORPS V AND CERTAIN SELECTED STAFF MEMBERS IN ATTENDANCE.

A. AMONG OTHER SUBJECTS DISCUSSED WAS THE NECESSITY OF III MAF AND PROV CORPS V CONDUCTING A STUDY IN DEPTH OF AN OPTIMUM MILITARY POSTURE IN NORTHERN I CORPS FOR 1 SEP 1968. GEN WESTMORELAND WANTS RECOMMENDATIONS BY 1 APRIL 1968.

Comus MACV requirement

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